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BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-7-500:2017:2018 Edition

BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-7-500:2017:2018 Edition

$215.11

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Basic information and communication structure. Use of logical nodes for modeling application functions and related concepts and guidelines for substations

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BSI 2018 88
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This part of IEC 61850, which is a technical report, describes the use of the information model for devices and functions of IEC 61850 in applications in substation automation systems, but it may also be used as informative input for the modeling of any other application domain. In particular, it describes the use of compatible logical node names and data objects names for communication between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) for use cases. This includes the relationship between Logical Nodes and Data Objects for the given use cases. If needed for the understanding of the use cases, the application of services is also described informatively. If different options cannot be excluded they are also mentioned.

The modelling of the use cases given in this document are based on the class model introduced in IEC 61850-7-1 and defined in IEC 61850-7-2. The logical node and data names used in this document are defined in IEC 61850-7-4 and IEC 61850-7-3, the services applied in IEC 61850-7-2. The naming conventions of IEC 61850-7-2 are also applied in this document.

If extensions are needed in the use cases, the normative naming rules for multiple instances and private, compatible extensions of Logical Node (LN) Classes and Data Object Names defined in IEC 61850-7-1 are considered.

IEC 61850-7-5 describes in examples the use of logical nodes for modeling application functions and related concepts and guidelines in general, independently from any application domain respectively valid for all application domains in the electric power system (substation automation, distributed energy resources, hydro power, wind power, etc.). This document describes in examples the use of logical nodes for application functions in substation automation including also line protection between substations. It also implies some tutorial material where helpful. However it is recommended to read IEC 61850-5 and IEC 61850-7-1 in conjunction with IEC 61850-7-3 and IEC 61850-7-2 first.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
2 undefined
4 CONTENTS
8 FOREWORD
10 INTRODUCTION
11 1 Scope
2 Normative references
12 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1 Terms and definitions
13 3.2 Abbreviated terms
14 4 Basics of substation automation with IEC 61850
4.1 Architecture
4.2 Communication and relevance of bus definitions
Figures
Figure 1 – Architecture of a substation automation system
15 5 Summary of substation automation functions
5.1 HMI and related station level functions
5.2 Operational or control functions
5.3 Monitoring and metering functions
5.4 Local automation functions (protection and others)
5.5 Distributed automation functions (protection and others)
16 5.6 System support functions
6 Basic interaction of control and protection functions modeled by logical nodes
17 Figure 2 – Interaction of LNs for the application functionsin SA focused on XCBR
Tables
Table 1 – Short summary of logical nodes names
18 Figure 3 – Interaction of LNs for the applicationfunctions in SA focused on XSWI
19 7 Function allocation and logical architecture
7.1 Allocation of functions to IEDs
7.2 Data Model as used in this Technical Report
7.3 Logical architecture
7.3.1 Station level
7.3.3 Process level
7.4 Interfaces
7.4.1 Interface to CC and other remote operator places
20 7.4.2 Interface to neighbouring substation
7.4.3 Interface to the process (switchyard)
7.4.4 Implementation remark
8 Communication system architectures
8.1 Modeling and communication architectures
8.2 Specific modeling aspects of the process interface
8.2.1 Merging unit and data sampling
21 8.2.2 Breaker IED and switchgear control
8.2.3 Time synchronization
8.3 Use cases
8.3.1 General remarks
22 8.3.2 Station bus and process bus separated
Figure 4 – Station bus and process bus separated
23 8.3.3 Station bus and process bus connected by proxy servers
24 Figure 5 – Station bus and process busconnected by proxy servers
Figure 6 – Station bus and processbus interconnected
25 8.3.4 Station bus and process bus interconnected
8.3.5 Common features for all three use case architectures
27 Table 2 – Mapping of communication services to architectures 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3
28 9 Basic modeling principles
9.1 Protection, measurement and control
Figure 7 – Basic LN models for (a) protection, (b) measurement and (c) control
30 9.2 Supervision
Figure 8 – Basic LN models for supervision of (a) insulation,(b) temperature and (c) arc
31 10 General modelling issues in substations
10.1 Basic modelling of three-phase systems
10.1.1 Acquisition of position indication
Figure 9 – Relation between the phase-relatedpositions and the common position
32 10.1.2 Acquisition of currents and voltages and the trips
Figure 10 – Filtering of phase related positiondata to a common position
33 10.2 Considering transmission times for GOOSE messages
Figure 11 – Acquisition of current and voltage andtripping in the three phase system
34 11 Control
11.1 Bay control without process bus
11.1.1 Basic diagram
Figure 12 – Modelling bay control without process bus (left: ok, right: wrong)
35 11.1.2 General modeling rules
11.1.3 Modeling with process interface nodes and the role of GGIO and GAPC
36 Figure 13 – Bay control with non-defined process object “door” represented by LN GGIO
37 11.2 Bay control with process bus
11.2.1 Basic diagram
Figure 14 – Bay control (left: without process bus, right: with process bus)
38 11.3 Control in the three-phase system
11.3.1 Interconnection of logical nodes
Figure 15 – Three-phase (left and middle) and single-phase control (right) with process bus
39 11.4 Interlocking, synchrocheck and blocking
11.4.1 General remarks
40 Figure 16 – Interlocking, synchrocheck and blockingcheck in control IED without PB
41 11.4.2 Interlocking
Figure 17 – Interlocking, synchrocheck andblocking check with process bus PB
42 11.4.3 Blocking
11.4.4 Recommendation
43 11.4.5 Synchrocheck
11.5 Control authority
11.5.1 Operation 1 out of n
Figure 18 – Relation between interlocking, synchrocheck,blocking and control authority
44 11.5.2 Control authority management
45 Table 3 – Logical nodes with control authority and related presence conditions
47 11.5.3 Logical node representation
Figure 19 – Local remote authority switching at bay and process level
48 Figure 20 – Station level authority switching
49 11.6 Operation of switchgear with process bus
11.6.1 The control service
11.6.2 Extension of the control model by GOOSE messages in tabular form
50 Table 4 – Extension of the control model by GOOSE messages between CSWI and XCBR
51 11.6.3 Extension of the control model by a sequence of GOOSE control messages
Figure 21 – Switch control (SBO with enhanced security) with a sequence ofGOOSE control messages between BCU (“CSWI”)and CBC (“XCBR”) – Part 1
52 Figure 22 – Switch control (SBO with enhanced security) with a sequenceof GOOSE control messages between BCU (“CSWI”)and CBC (“XCBR”) – Part 2
53 11.6.4 Alignment of the control model in CSWI and XCBR
11.6.5 Behavior “Blocked” and “Testblocked” in case of process bus
54 12 Protection
12.1 Bay protection without process bus
12.1.1 Basic diagram
12.1.2 Modeling rules
Figure 23 – Bay protection without process bus (left: modeling = ok, right: modeling = wrong)
55 12.2 Bay protection with process bus
12.2.1 Basic diagram
Figure 24 – Bay protection (left: without process bus,right: with process bus)
56 12.2.2 Modeling protection of three-phase system
12.3 Modelling of a protection function by multiple instances
12.3.1 PDIF
Figure 25 – Three-phase trip (left) and single-phasetrip (right) with process bus
57 12.3.2 PDIS
12.4 Modelling of different stages of a protection function by multiple instances
12.4.1 Different trip levels and curves shown by PTOC as example
12.4.2 PDSC – Phase discrepancy protection
58 Figure 26 – Phase discrepancy protection
59 13 Redundant protection and control
13.1 Redundant protection
Figure 27 – Single phase tripping and supervisionby main 1 and main 2 protection
60 13.2 Redundant control
Figure 28 – Single phase redundant control
61 13.3 Use of PTRC and testing
Figure 29 – Basic use of PTRC for protection tripping
Figure 30 – PTRC used for grouping of closely related LNs
62 14 Circuit breaker modelling by breaker related LNs (XCBR, SCBR and SOPM)
Figure 31 – Two PTRCs for partial testing of the protection functions
63 15 Dedicated functions
15.1 Disturbance recording
64 Figure 32 – Structure of the disturbance recorder (RDRE, RADR, RBDR)
65 15.2 Point-on-wave switching
66 Figure 33 – Point-on-wave switching with all LNs needed in one IED (IED1)
Figure 34 – Point-on-wave switching with Merging Unit (MU) in IED2
67 Figure 35 – Point-on-wave switching with processbus and time synchronization
68 15.3 Breaker failure protection
Figure 36 – Single and three-phase trippingand breaker failure protection
69 Figure 37 – Single phase tripping and breaker failure protectionin a double tripping coil application
70 15.4 Line differential protection
71 15.5 Line distance protection
Figure 38 – Three-end line differential protection with LN RMXU
72 15.6 Autorecloser (RREC)
15.6.1 Introduction
15.6.2 Autorecloser interconnection
Figure 39 – Distance protection with communication(block, permit, direct trip)
73 Figure 40 – Interaction of autorecloser (RREC)with other functions
74 15.6.3 Autorecloser states and transitions
Figure 41 – Autoreclosure (RREC) states and transitions(dashed transitions are examples for possiblealternative transitions – see text)
77 15.7 Switch on to fault
15.7.1 LN: Switch on to fault Name: PSOF
78 15.8 Reverse blocking
Figure 42 – Switch-on-to-fault protection function PSOF
79 Figure 43 – Reverse blocking data flow with one infeed
80 Annex A (normative)Switch-on-to-fault
81 Annex B (normative)LN PSOF
84 Annex C (normative)LN RREC: Autoreclosure
86 Bibliography

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BSI PD IEC/TR 61850-7-500:2017
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