{"id":261689,"date":"2024-10-19T17:20:31","date_gmt":"2024-10-19T17:20:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-iso-26262-102018-tc\/"},"modified":"2024-10-25T13:07:58","modified_gmt":"2024-10-25T13:07:58","slug":"bs-iso-26262-102018-tc","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-iso-26262-102018-tc\/","title":{"rendered":"BS ISO 26262-10:2018 – TC"},"content":{"rendered":"
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
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163<\/td>\n | undefined <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
169<\/td>\n | Foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
171<\/td>\n | Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
174<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
175<\/td>\n | 3 Terms and definitions 4 Key concepts of ISO 26262 4.1 Functional safety for automotive systems (relationship with IEC 61508[1]) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
177<\/td>\n | 4.2 Item, system, element, component, hardware part and software unit <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
178<\/td>\n | 4.3 Relationship between faults, errors and failures 4.3.1 Progression of faults to errors to failures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
179<\/td>\n | 4.4 FTTI and emergency operation tolerant time interval 4.4.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
180<\/td>\n | 4.4.2 Timing model \u2014 Example control system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
182<\/td>\n | 5 Selected topics regarding safety management 5.1 Work product 5.2 Confirmation measures 5.2.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
183<\/td>\n | 5.2.2 Functional safety assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
185<\/td>\n | 5.3 Understanding of safety cases 5.3.1 Interpretation of safety cases <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
186<\/td>\n | 5.3.2 Safety case development lifecycle 6 Concept phase and system development 6.1 General 6.2 Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment 6.2.1 General 6.2.2 HARA example 1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
187<\/td>\n | 6.2.3 HARA example 2 6.3 An observation regarding controllability classification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
188<\/td>\n | 6.4 External measures 6.4.1 General 6.4.2 Example of vehicle dependent external measures 1 6.4.3 Example of vehicle dependent external measures 2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
189<\/td>\n | 6.5 Example of combining safety goals 6.5.1 Introduction 6.5.2 General 6.5.3 Function definition 6.5.4 Safety goals applied to the same hazard in different situations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
190<\/td>\n | 7 Safety process requirement structure \u2014 Flow and sequence of the safety requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
192<\/td>\n | 8 Concerning hardware development 8.1 The classification of random hardware faults 8.1.1 General 8.1.2 Single-point fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
193<\/td>\n | 8.1.3 Residual fault 8.1.4 Detected dual-point fault 8.1.5 Perceived dual-point fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
194<\/td>\n | 8.1.6 Latent dual-point fault 8.1.7 Safe fault 8.1.8 Flow diagram for fault classification and fault class contribution calculation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
198<\/td>\n | 8.1.9 How to consider the failure rate of multiple-point faults related to software-based safety mechanisms addressing random hardware failures 8.2 Example of residual failure rate and local single-point fault metric evaluation 8.2.1 General 8.2.2 Technical safety requirement for sensor A_Master <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
199<\/td>\n | 8.2.3 Description of the safety mechanism <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
202<\/td>\n | 8.2.4 Evaluation of example 1 described in Figure 12 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
210<\/td>\n | 8.3 Further explanation concerning hardware 8.3.1 How to deal with microcontrollers in the context of an ISO 26262 series of standards application 8.3.2 Safety analysis methods <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
217<\/td>\n | 8.4 PMHF units \u2014 Average probability per hour <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
220<\/td>\n | 9 Safety Element out of Context 9.1 Safety Element out of Context development <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
221<\/td>\n | 9.2 Use cases 9.2.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
222<\/td>\n | 9.2.2 Development of a system as a Safety Element out of Context example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
224<\/td>\n | 9.2.3 Development of a hardware component as a Safety Element out of Context example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
226<\/td>\n | 9.2.4 Development of a software component as a Safety Element out of Context example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
228<\/td>\n | 10 An example of proven in use argument 10.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
229<\/td>\n | 10.2 Item definition and definition of the proven in use candidate 10.3 Change analysis 10.4 Target values for proven in use <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
230<\/td>\n | 11 Concerning ASIL decomposition 11.1 Objective of ASIL decomposition 11.2 Description of ASIL decomposition 11.3 An example of ASIL decomposition 11.3.1 General 11.3.2 Item definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
231<\/td>\n | 11.3.3 Hazard analysis and risk assessment 11.3.4 Associated safety goal 11.3.5 System architectural design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
232<\/td>\n | 11.3.6 Functional safety concept <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
233<\/td>\n | 12 Guidance for system development with safety-related availability requirements 12.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
234<\/td>\n | 12.2 Notes on concept phase when specifying fault tolerance 12.2.1 General 12.2.2 Vehicle operating states in which the availability of a functionality is safety-related 12.2.3 Prevention of hazardous events after a fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
235<\/td>\n | 12.2.4 Operation after fault reaction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
236<\/td>\n | 12.2.5 Fault tolerant item example <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
241<\/td>\n | 12.2.6 ASIL decomposition of fault tolerant items <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
242<\/td>\n | 12.3 Availability considerations during hardware design phase 12.3.1 Random hardware fault quantitative analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
244<\/td>\n | 12.4 Software development phase 12.4.1 Software fault avoidance and tolerance 12.4.2 Software fault avoidance 12.4.3 Software fault tolerance <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
245<\/td>\n | 13 Remark on \u201cConfidence in the use of software tools\u201d <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
246<\/td>\n | 14 Guidance on safety-related special characteristics 14.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
247<\/td>\n | 14.2 Identification of safety-related special characteristics 14.3 Specification of the control measures of safety-related special characteristics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
248<\/td>\n | 14.4 Monitoring of the safety-related special characteristics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
249<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative) Fault tree construction and applications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
252<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Tracked Changes. Road vehicles. Functional safety – Guidelines on ISO 26262<\/b><\/p>\n |